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Developing Oversight Frameworks for
Nanobiotechnology
Jordan Paradise, Susan M. Wolf, Gurumurthy
Ramachandran, Efrosini Kokkoli, Ralph Hall & Jennifer
Kuzma*
Nanotechnology involves the ability to work at the atomic
and molecular level to create structures with fundamentally
new molecular structures in order to exploit novel properties
that do not normally exist at a larger size. The National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), made up of twenty-six U.S.
federal agencies including the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
contributed to the development of a description of
nanotechnology as involving:
(1) [r]esearch and technology development at the atomic, molecular
or macromolecular levels, in the length scale of approximately 1-100
nanometer range; (2) creating and using structures, devices and
systems that have novel properties and functions because of their
small and/or intermediate size; and (3) ability to control or
manipulate at the atomic scale. 1
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This is a burgeoning field with a large number of potential
applications in medicine, drug development, engineering,
robotics, electronics, fiber optics, energy, food and agriculture,
and environmental science. Nanobiotechnology specifically
refers to nanotechnology designed for use in biological systems
or in which nanomaterials are derived from biological
molecules. 2 Over 500 products advertised as nanotechnologybased consumer products have already hit the market. 3 These
include products with biologically active nanostructures (e.g.,
Spray For Life® Nano-Synergy Vitamin B12 Energy Booster,
Abraxane™ anticancer drug, and Canola Active cooking oil
fortified with phytosterol nanocapsules). 4
Oversight systems specific to nanotechnology have not yet
been created; stakeholders, government, industry, academia,
and the public are debating whether and how to craft such
systems and address emerging safety, social, and ethical
issues. 5 The United States has no coordinated policy for
oversight of the products and applications of nanotechnology
and uncertainty prevails over how existing general regulatory
regimes and industry standards apply to emerging
nanotechnologies.
Empirical assessment of health and
environmental risks is still in process. At the same time,
public understanding of nanotechnology is rudimentary and

Foundation. The authors would like to thank Research Assistants Rishi
Gupta, M.S.; Jee-Ae Kim; Adam Kokotovitch; Gail Mattey Diliberto; Pouya
Najmaie; and Alison Wedekind for their valuable input on the project. The
authors would also like to thank Audrey Boyle for her coordination of the
project.
1. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NANOTECHNOLOGY: AN EPA RESEARCH
PERSPECTIVE:
FACTSHEET
(2007),
available
at
http://
es.epa.gov/ncer/nano/factsheet/nanofactsheetjune07.pdf.
2. M.C. Roco, Nanoscale Science and Engineering: Unifying and
Transforming Tools, 50 AM. INST. CHEMICAL ENGINEERS 890, 895–96 (2004).
3. See The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, An Inventory of Nanotechnology-Based
Consumer
Products
Currently
on
the
Market,
http://www.nanotechproject.org/ inventories/consumer/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2008).
4. Id.
5. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY
27–28
(2006),
available
at
http://www.
nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/managing_effects_nanotechnology/.
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public
concern
exists. 6
Nanotechnology,
and
nanobiotechnology specifically, warrants active discussion of
potential oversight mechanisms to assure public confidence in
safety and, when health effects are a goal, efficacy. This
article focuses on nanobiotechnology, which most directly
raises questions of how oversight can address safety and
efficacy, outlines the current debate on oversight in the United
States, suggests why deliberate development of oversight
strategies is important, and recommends how to develop them.
I. THE OVERSIGHT DEBATE
Developing oversight approaches for nanobiotechnology is
daunting. Nanobiotechnology encompasses a wide range of
fields and products; a single oversight model may be
unrealistic. Some argue that nanotechnology is suitably
covered by existing regulatory and non-regulatory oversight
Others disagree, arguing that nanoproducts
activities. 7
already on the market have failed to receive the oversight they
require. 8 The debate centers on issues including modes of
human exposure, toxicity levels, increased reactivity and novel
physical properties of nanoparticles, possibility for
environmental
dispersion,
and
unique
physiological
distribution in the body such as the ability to cross the bloodbrain barrier.
Canvassing oversight options for
nanotechnology requires considering government regulatory
structures, systems for coordinating multiple agency action,
non-governmental standards, and international frameworks.
A. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
U.S. federal agencies have begun to consider oversight
options. The EPA oversees human exposure to chemicals in
6. JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, INFORMED PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8–13
(2005),
available
at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/informed_
public_perceptions/.
7. Ted Agres, Disagreement About FDA Nanotech Oversight, SCIENTIST,
Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/25041/.
8. See Ctr. for Sci., Tech. & Pub. Policy, Univ. of Minn., The
Nanotechnology-Biology Interface: Exploring Models for Oversight:
Workshop Report 18–28 (Jennifer Kuzma ed., 2005), available at
http://www.hhh.umn. edu/img/assets/9685/nanotech_jan06.pdf.
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the environment under a number of statutes. One statute
that may apply to exposure to nanochemicals is the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92,
developed 30 years ago. 9 TSCA regulates “new chemicals”
beyond those existing chemicals listed in TSCA Inventory. 10
Since many nanochemicals are variations of chemicals listed
in TSCA Inventory, although at much smaller sizes and often
with different properties and characteristics, questions remain
about whether nanoparticles are “new” chemicals under
TSCA, which would be the trigger for pre-market notification.
This issue has taken on some urgency as a major carbon
nanotube (CNT) manufacturer and supplier has classified its
carbon nanotubes as synthetic graphite, 11 a relatively
innocuous substance listed on the TSCA Inventory, despite the
fact that toxicity studies to date show CNTs to have a higher
toxicity than traditional graphite. 12 In 2005, the EPA held
public meetings and requested comments on the feasibility of
a voluntary oversight program involving industry cooperation
in creating industry-wide standards for developing and
commercializing chemicals at the nanoscale. 13 The EPA
formed the National Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory
Committee Interim Ad Hoc Work Group on Nanoscale
Materials in 2005 in order to design this voluntary nanoscale
materials program and to consider potential EPA review of
nanoscale materials under TSCA. 14 EPA oversight efforts
have been focused on catalyzing private voluntary agreement

9. The Toxic Substances Control Act was originally enacted on October
11, 1976 by Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(9) (2000).
11. UNIDYM, INC., MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET: UNIDYM CARBON
NANOTUBES 1 (2007), available at http://www.unidym.com/files/msds_cni_
nanotubes.pdf.
12. Chui-wing Lam et al., A Review of Carbon Nanotube Toxicity and
Assessment of Potential Occupational and Environmental Health Risks, 36
CRITICAL REVIEWS TOXICOLOGY 189, 206 (2006).
13. Notice of Public Meeting on Nanoscale Materials, 70 Fed. Reg. 24574
(May 10, 2005).
14. INTERIM AD HOC WORK GROUP ON NANOSCALE MATERIALS, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NAT’L POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS ADVISORY
COMM. (NPPTAC), OVERVIEW OF ISSUES FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND
CONSIDERATION
BY
NPPTAC
1
(2005),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/npptac/pubs/nanowgoverviewdraft050921finalv2.pdf
.
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on standards. 15 In addition, the agency in 2007 proposed a
voluntary framework for manufacturers of nanomaterials
under TSCA. 16 There have been analyses of EPA’s ability to
regulate nanomaterials under TSCA which suggest that the
law is inadequate or is being interpreted in a manner that
does not ensure pre-market testing and safety. 17 In November
2006, the EPA utilized a different approach and announced its
intent to regulate consumer items developed with silver
nanoparticles marketed as “germ-killing” (including many food
storage containers, air fresheners, and washing machines) as
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act due to concerns regarding environmental
release. 18
The FDA also has authority over certain nanoproducts,
especially biologically active nanostructures in human drugs
and medical devices. 19 The agency generally regulates on a
product-by-product basis, with products often categorized
according to the mode of action, and uses intended by the
manufacturer.
The FDA currently applies its existing
regulatory approaches for drugs, medical devices, combination
products, foods, and cosmetics to nanotechnology products. 20
This approach has been questioned, with some arguing that
nanotechnology warrants its own oversight provisions. 21
15. Id.
16. Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program and Inventory Status of
Nanoscale Substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act: Notice of
Availability, 72 Fed. Reg. 38083, 38085–86 (July 12, 2007).
17. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, EPA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY:
OVERSIGHT
FOR
THE
21ST
CENTURY
(2007),
available
at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/epa_nanotechnology_ove
rsight_for_21st/; see also Jennifer Kuzma, Nanotechnology Oversight: Just Do
It, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10913, 10923 (2006).
18. Rick Weiss, EPA to Regulate Nanoproducts Sold as Germ-Killing,
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2006 at A01; Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351–60 (2000).
20. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA REGULATION OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS, http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/regulation.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2008).
21. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, REGULATING THE PRODUCTS
OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: DOES FDA HAVE THE TOOLS IT NEEDS? 45–53 (2006),
available
at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/
regulating_products_nanotechnology_does/.
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Meanwhile, the FDA is reviewing, and in some cases has
approved, nanoproducts using established oversight paths
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). 22
Under this statute, new drugs are regulated through a premarket testing and approval process and have to meet safety,
efficacy, and manufacturing standards. Higher risk devices
must go through a pre-market application process showing
that the device is safe and effective, while a lower risk device
can be marketed if shown to be substantially equivalent to an
already marketed device. Food and cosmetic products may be
marketed without FDA evaluation or review, though for
genetically engineered food products, the FDA and industry
engage in voluntary consultation prior to market entry. In
2006, the FDA established a Nanotechnology Task Force to
investigate “regulatory approaches that encourage the
continued development of innovative, safe and effective FDAregulated products that use nanotechnology materials.” 23
Following a public hearing in October 2006, the Task Force
released its findings in mid-2007. This report concluded that
the FDA need not develop a new regulatory framework or
special regulations for nanotechnology at the current time.
Furthermore, the report concluded that no new labeling was
necessary to indicate that specific products included
nanoparticles or were manufactured using nanotechnology. 24
Using its established oversight paths, the FDA has approved
nano-drug products such as Abraxane® anticancer drug 25 and
Estasorb® topical estrogen therapy 26 as well as nano-device
products such as Vitoss® bone graft substitute 27 and EnSeal™
22. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2000).
23. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Forms Internal
Nanotechnology Task Force, (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/06/briefing/2006-4241B1-02-33-FDANano%20FDA%20News %20release.pdf.
24. NANOTECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
NANOTECHNOLOGY
34
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/
nanotechnology/taskforce/report2007.pdf.
25. See Abraxis Biosciences, Inc. for information on Abraxane. Abraxane
Home Page, http://abraxane.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
26. See Graceway Pharmaceuticals, LLC for information on Estrasorb.
Estrasorb Home Page, http://www.estrasorb.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
27. See Orthovita, Inc. for information on Vitoss. Vitoss Home Page,
http://orthovitaportal.com/Vitoss%20Technical%20Information/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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tissue sealing and hemostatis system for laparoscopic and
open surgery. 28 Many cosmetic products have entered the
market that contain nanoparticles, such as BINOVA
Cosmetics by Barneys New York®, Collagen Fusion™
Botanical Skincare System by AmerElite Solutions®, and
Lipoduction™ Body Perfecting Complex by Osmotics.® 29
Another
U.S.
agency
with
relevant
oversight
responsibilities is the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) pursuant to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHAct). 30 Health standards for workplace
exposure to toxic substances are established after public notice
of proposed standards and eliciting public comments. This
approach
to
overseeing
occupational
exposure
to
nanomaterials might be attempted, although OSHA has not
yet taken any steps in this direction. Current concerns in the
workplace include engineered nanoparticles such as fullerenes
and carbon nanotubes. 31 However, critics have challenged
OSHA’s oversight methods, questioning the scientific basis of
standards, the role of economic factors and cost-benefit
analysis in standard setting, how the agency has assessed the
feasibility of standards, and the extent to which OSHAct
allows nuanced consideration of degrees of risk. Given that
OSHA bears the burden of carrying out detailed risk
assessments for the thousands of toxic substances on the
market and that proposed standards must also be
technologically feasible, 32 critics have charged that OSHA’s
oversight approach is inadequate for nanomaterials.
Another relevant regulatory federal agency, the
Department of Agriculture (USDA), has yet to act on oversight
issues of nanotechnology, although it funds nanotechnology
28. See SurgRX, Inc. for information on EnSeal. EnSeal Home Page,
http://www.surgrx.com/product.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
29. See The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, supra note 3.
30. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2000).
31. The University of Minnesota recently held the Second International
Symposium on Nanotechnology and Occupational Health on October 3–6,
2005 focusing on issues of implications of nanotechnology in the workplace.
UNIV. OF MINN., 2D INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON NANOTECHNOLOGY AND
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH
(2005),
available
at
http://www.environcorp.com/img/ media/CPE1322_NanoTechPrgBkt_2.pdf.
32. Nicholas A. Ashford & Charles C. Caldart, Government Regulation,
in OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND
PREVENTING DISEASE AND INJURY 39, 43–45 (Barry S. Levy, David H.
Wegman, Sherry L. Baron & Rosemary K. Sokas eds., 5th ed. 2006).
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research on food and agriculture. 33 Similarly, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) actively
funds research into metrics for characterizing worker
exposures, new measurement technologies, and for validating
technologies for controlling inhalation exposures. 34 With
respect to nanotechnology specifically, NIOSH has organized
workshops on technical issues relating to measurement
methods and exposure assessment and has been proactive in
terms of research initiatives and education. 35 However, it has
not yet delved into issues of nanotechnology oversight. 36
Thus, it appears that among U.S. federal agencies, the FDA
and EPA have begun to consider how to oversee
nanotechnology activities and products, while OSHA, USDA,
and NIOSH have not yet taken significant steps in considering
oversight mechanisms.
B. SYSTEMS TO COORDINATE AGENCIES
Because nanotechnology implicates a number of
government agencies, coordination is a significant issue.
Systems for coordination must be considered part of the
oversight debate. An example of one such system is the U.S.
Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology,
created by the federal Office of Science and Technology Policy
in 1986 to coordinate regulation of products of biotechnology
according to their intended use. 37 The Framework identifies
the EPA, FDA, and USDA as lead agencies to regulate specific
products, envisioning that a single product may be regulated
by a number of federal agencies. 38 The Framework sees the
products of biotechnology as the focus of regulation, rather
33. JENNIFER KUZMA & PETER VERHAGE, WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, PROJECT ON EMERGING
NANOTECHNOLOGIES, NANOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
PRODUCTION: ANTICIPATED APPLICATIONS 16 (2006), available at http://www.
nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/nanotechnology_in_agriculture_food
/.
34. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 671(22) (2000).
35. See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Nanotechnology at NIOSH, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/nanotech/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2007).
36. Id.
37. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed.
Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986).
38. Id.
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than the field of biotechnology. 39 Existing statutes are thus
deemed sufficient and the agencies are charged with
developing regulatory guidance and policies as needed under
those statutes. 40
This Framework has not been applied to nanotechnology
as yet. 41 Applying the Framework or a comparable approach
to nanotechnology would create a coordinated framework
among the key governmental agencies. As part of such a
nanotechnology framework, relevant agencies could develop
new regulatory structures, more specific guidance documents,
However, there is debate over
and policy as needed. 42
whether this model has worked well for the products of
biotechnology and specifically genetically engineered
organisms (GEOs). There have been no reports of large-scale
adverse effects of GEOs on human or animal health or the
environment, but critics have challenged the success of the
Coordinated
Framework
in
achieving
interagency
coordination, the adequacy of existing statutes to handle
GEOs, and the success of agencies in performing risk
assessment and providing guidance for product developers. 43
C. STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES
Many states are recognizing and encouraging the
development and commercialization of nanotechnology
through funding initiatives and other support. These statutes
span a variety of commitments to nanotechnology, yet do not
provide oversight mechanisms. These provisions include
identifying nanotechnology as a priority for the particular
state; establishing monetary support and plans to develop and
maintain research facilities; encouraging the application of
nanotechnologies in particular areas, such as pharmaceuticals
and environmental applications; creation of state tax credits or
tax exemptions for costs of a facility designing, developing, or
producing nanotechnology; issuing grants and advancing
educational initiatives; and fostering industry-university
39. Id.
40. Id. at 23303.
41. Jennifer Kuzma, Nanotechnology Oversight: Just Do It, 36 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10913, 10920 (2006).
42. Id. at 10922–23.
43. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PESTPROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION 28–37, 144–78 (2000).
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collaborations. 44
The city of Berkeley, California has passed a
nanotechnology-specific ordinance regarding mandatory
reporting procedures. The disclosure guidelines require “[a]ll
facilities that manufacture or use manufactured nanoparticles
shall submit a separate written disclosure of the current
toxicology, to the extent known, and how the facility will
safely handle, monitor, contain, dispose, track inventory,
prevent release and mitigate such materials.” 45 The city of
Cambridge, Massachusetts is also considering adopting an
ordinance similar to that passed in Berkeley. 46 A seventeenmember advisory board made up of health and safety experts
from Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
has been appointed to make policy recommendations to the
Department of Public Health. 47 The cities of Boston and
Somerville, Massachusetts are also reportedly considering
44. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. III, § 17; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 14-144204(a)(15), (b)(2)(J), 15-4-2102(f)(2), 15-4-2103(a) (2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
88500(e) (Deering 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-48.5-108(3)(a), (c)(I)(B), 3926-722(1) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-124hh(a)(5), (b)(4)(A)-(C), (c)(3)
(2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-28-10(4)(2)(E) (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 74-99b83, 74-99b04 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 23I, §§ (1)(7), (2),
(4)–(5) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 125.2088a(a)(ii) (2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:9X-12(II) (West 2007); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 209(7) (Consol. 2007);
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3154(10(a) (Consol. 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B437.44(4) (2007); OKL. ST. ANN. tit. 74 § 5060.1(a) (West 2007); OKL. ST. ANN.
tit. 75 § 5060.4(14), 5060.43 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 284.740,
351.350(11)(4)(b), 351.509 (West 2007); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6250.902(c)
(West 2007); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 695(a)(1)(K) (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §
2-75-90(A), (B) (2005); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 481.0296(a)(5), 489.213(b),
489.213(e), 489.213(h) (Vernon 2006); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 490.003(b)(7)
(Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-38g-303(1)(c) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §
2.2-255(9) (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.48(25r) (West 2006).
45. BERKELEY, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 15.12.040(I) (2007); see also
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25500 (2007) (“[I]t is not the intent of the
Legislature to preempt . . . local ordinances containing the same or greater
standards and protections” regarding the release or threatened release of
hazardous materials.); TOXICS MGMT. DIV., CITY OF BERKELEY PLANNING &
DEV. DEP’T, INTRODUCTION TO MANUFACTURED NANOSCALE MATERIAL
HEALTH & SAFETY DISCLOSURE FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD OF JUNE 1, 2007
- JUNE 2, 2008 (2007), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/toxics/
Manufactured%20Nanoparticle%20Reporting%20Final.pdf.
46. Hiawatha Bray, Cambridge Considers Nanotech Curbs, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2007, at C1.
47. Catherine Williams, Big Talks Over Small Tech, MASS HIGH TECH,
June 15, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/masshightech/
stories/2007/06/18/story1.html.
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similar ordinances. 48 These initiatives, while not oversight of
nanotechnology per se, are an initial attempt by cities to
require some local level of reporting and accountability for use
of nanoparticles.
D. NON-GOVENMENTAL STANDARDS
Oversight can be performed not just by government, but
also by private companies and industry groups coordinating to
articulate standards and create safeguards. The Foresight
Nanotech Institute, a nonprofit institute, has published
voluntary “Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology
Development” recommended for industry adoption. 49 The nonprofit Institute for Molecular Manufacturing has also proposed
industry guidelines specific to molecular nanotechnology with
the assistance of the Foresight Nanotech Institute. 50 DuPont
has partnered with the non-profit Environmental Defense to
develop a corporate framework to assess nanotechnology
risk. 51 The framework was published in Summer 2007 and
focuses on steps for risk assessment within organizations that
Several non-governmental
manufacture nanomaterials. 52
consumer and environmental organizations have been critical
of the framework as it is premised on voluntary oversight and
industry self-regulation. 53
E. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT
Other countries are also beginning to take action on
nanotechnology oversight.
The British government, for
example, commissioned the Royal Society and the Royal
Academy of Engineering, two premiere independent science
48. Bray, supra note 46.
49. Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology
Development, FORESIGHT NANOTECH INST., April 2006, http://www.foresight.
org/guidelines/current.html (draft version 6).
50. Neil Jacobstein, Foresight Guidelines for Responsible Nanotechnology
Development, INST. MOLECULAR MANUFACTURING, April, 2006, http://www.
imm.org/guidelines/ (draft version 6).
51. Virginia Gewin, Nanotech’s Big Issue, 443 NATURE 137, 137 (2006).
52. ENVTL. DEFENSE-DUPONT NANO PARTNERSHIP, NANO: RISK
FRAMEWORK, 7 (2007), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/
documents/6496_Nano%20Risk%20Framework.pdf.
53. Activist Groups Reject DuPont-ED Nanotechnology Risk Framework,
Apr.
12,
2007,
NANOWERK,
http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1766.php.
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academies, to study developments in the field and to identify
the potential pros and cons of nanotechnologies for society. 54
In a joint 2004 report, the academies proposed a ban on some
uses of nanotechnology, stating that “the use of free (that is,
not fixed in a matrix) manufactured nanoparticles in
environmental applications such as remediation [should] be
prohibited until appropriate research has been undertaken
and it can be demonstrated that the potential benefits
outweigh the potential risks.” 55
In France, the Ethics Committee of the French National
Centre for Scientific Research (COMETS) published an
October 2006 opinion, listing eight ethics recommendations for
nanotechnology, including the creation of ethics guidelines for
researchers. 56 COMETS has advocated adoption of these
recommendations by the French Ministry of Health and the
French National Assembly’s parliamentary office on scientific
and technological policy. 57
At the European Union level, the European Economic and
Social Committee of the European Parliament published an
opinion in 2005 recommending that the European Commission
introduce methods to identify nanotechnology risks and
propose European guidelines by 2008. 58
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OVERSIGHT DEBATE
This review of early oversight efforts by U.S.
governmental agencies and non-governmental actors as well
as international oversight efforts demonstrates the need for
more work. No one agreed-upon approach or ideal model has
54. THE ROYAL SOC’Y & THE ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, NANOSCIENCE AND
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES (2004), available
at http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm.
55. Id. at 85 (follow link titled “Chapter 10-Recommendations”).
56. Press Release, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, The
CNRS Ethics Committee Publishes Its Recommendations on Nanotechnology
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www2.cnrs.fr/en/727.htm.
57. Id.
58. EUROPEAN ECON. & SOC. COMM., OPINION ON THE COMMUNICATION
FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
THE
ECONOMIC
AND
SOCIAL
COMMITTEE—NANOSCIENCES
AND
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: AN ACTION PLAN FOR EUROPE 2005–2009 ¶ 3.5.7
(2006), available at http://eescopinions.eesc.europa.eu/viewdoc.aspx?doc=%5C
%5Cesppub1%5Cesp_public%5Cces%5Cint%5Cint277%5Cen%5Cces5822006_ ac_en.doc.
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yet emerged. A variety of reports have recently issued from
academics, professional organizations, scholarly organizations,
and government bodies assessing existing regulatory
frameworks, measuring public perceptions and understanding,
and suggesting oversight options. 59
This debate on nanotechnology oversight is important.
Progress in the field depends on societal interest, available
funding, and ultimately public confidence. Without
appropriate and effective oversight to minimize harms,
maximize benefits, and assure standards, public confidence
and funding may be at risk. Mishaps can retard development
of even the most promising of technologies. One recent study
shows that while consumers are excited about nanotechnology
and its potential benefits, there is already concern about who
is developing and promoting this technology, who will assess
and manage the potential risks, and who will be responsible
for monitoring products after they hit the marketplace. 60
The impact of past negative experiences with other new
59. See, e.g., COMM. TO REVIEW THE NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY
INITIATIVE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A MATTER OF SIZE: TRIENNIAL
REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE (2006), available at
http://www.nap. edu/catalog.php?record_id=11752; NANOSCALE SCI., ENG’G,
& TECH. SUBCOMM., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,
AND SAFETY RESEARCH NEEDS FOR ENGINEERED NANOSCALE MATERIALS
(2006), available at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_EHS_research_needs.pdf;
NANOTECHNOLOGY WORKGROUP, U.S. EPA, NANOTECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER
(2007), available at http://es.epa.gov/ncer/nano/publications/whitepaper
12022005.pdf; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., AM. BAR ASS’N,
EMS/INNOVATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND
RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, RCRA REGULATION OF WASTES FROM THE PRODUCTION,
USE, AND DISPOSAL OF NANOMATERIALS (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/ nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND
RES., AM. BAR ASS’N, REGULATION OF NANOSCALE MATERIALS UNDER THE
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
environ/nanotech/; SECTION OF ENV’T, ENERGY, AND RES., AM. BAR ASS’N,
THE ADEQUACY OF FIFRA TO REGULATE NANOTECHNOLOGY-BASED
PESTICIDES (2006), available at http://www.abanet. org/environ/nanotech/;
DAVIES, supra note 5; PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., REPORT
FINDINGS: BASED ON A NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADULTS (2006), available at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/file_download/98; ANDREW D. MAYNARD,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, PROJECT ON EMERGING
NANOTECHNOLOGIES, NANOTECHNOLOGY: A RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR
ADDRESSING
RISK
(2006),
available
at
http://www.nanotechproject.org/publications/archive/nanotechnology_researc
h_strategy_for/; CTR. FOR SCI., TECH., & PUB. POLICY, supra note 8.
60. MACOUBRIE, supra note 6.
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technologies shows the need to consider appropriate oversight
models for nanotechnology and then to develop whatever new
or modified oversight mechanisms, if any, are required. For
instance, the field of gene transfer research in human beings
(often called “gene therapy”) was jolted by the 1999 death of
18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger, a gene transfer research subject,
and subsequent revelations of other adverse events that had
not been successfully communicated between the key
oversight bodies: the FDA and the Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee (RAC). 61
Examples outside the domain of biomedicine include the
1999-2000 failure to segregate a genetically modified food
source approved only for animal feed. StarLink was a
genetically modified yellow corn variety containing an
insecticidal protein. 62 The EPA approved it for use only in
animal feed due to concern that the genetically modified
protein, Cry9C, did not break down easily in the human
digestive system and might provoke human allergies. 63
However, StarLink became commingled with corn-based
products in the human food supply in an evident failure of
enforcement by post-market oversight systems. 64 The
backlash and negative effect on public confidence were
considerable. 65
If nanotechnology is to avoid similar negative events and
ensuing setbacks, it is important to consider how to
proactively create and implement an effective oversight
system.
III. DEVELOPING OVERSIGHT OPTIONS FOR
NANOTECHNOLOGY
There are a number of oversight options for
nanotechnology, including creating new laws and regulations
for applications of nanotechnology, revising existing laws and
61. Doris Teicher Zallen, US Gene Therapy in Crisis, 16 TRENDS
GENETICS 272, 274 (2000).
62. MICHAEL R. TAYLOR & JODY S. TICK, THE STARLINK CASE: ISSUES
FOR THE FUTURE 3 (2001), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_
ektid33384.aspx?category=442.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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regulations, interpreting existing laws and regulations to
cover nanoproducts, designing new non-regulatory governance
approaches (e.g., voluntary standards), and revising existing
non-regulatory approaches.
Oversight frameworks and regulatory approaches are
diverse, and this oversight is conducted by a range of
institutions with various capabilities, cultures, and motives. 66
Regulations can articulate general guidelines or specific
standards. They can regulate the result or mandate the
processes by which the results are achieved. They can operate
by motivating industry to share information, innovate, or
change to meet articulated targets, or they can manage
industry more directly through what is often called “command
and control.” 67 Regulatory and oversight tools include
performance standards, tradable allowances, consultation
between government and industry, and pre-market safety and
efficacy reviews. The choice of approach can profoundly affect
technological development, individual interests, and collective
interests. 68 It is important to achieve an appropriate balance
so that oversight does not stifle innovation or impose
unnecessary costs or burdens.
Nanotechnology
may
pose
significant
oversight
challenges. The diversity of nanoproducts may preclude a
single approach or framework and instead require different
oversight regimes for different product types. In addition, risk
assessment for nanomaterials may be difficult. There is little
information to date on the effects of nanotechnology, including
what types of human exposure to anticipate, dose-response
relationships, kinetics and cellular interactions, fate and
transport in the environment, and correlations of properties of
materials to their toxicity. A number of commentators believe
that any risk assessment should consider the special
properties and effects of nanoparticles and that new toxicology
strategies are needed. 69 Disappointed with current movement
66. See John Abraham, Regulatory Science as Culture: Contested TwoDimensional Values at the US FDA, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 309–14, 329–31
(2002).
67. Jonathan B. Wiener, The Regulation of Technology, and the
Technology of Regulation, 26 TECH. SOC’Y 483, 489 (2004).
68. See generally id. (tracing the development and effects of various
types of regulatory instruments).
69. See, e.g., Günter Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging
Discipline Evolving from Studies of Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH
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towards voluntary and industry-driven schemes, a coalition of
civil society, public interest, environmental, and labor
organizations have signed a statement articulating general
principles for nanotechnology oversight. 70 These include the
creation of a precautionary foundation, developing mandatory
nano-specific regulations along with provisions for
manufacturer liability, assuring the health and safety of the
public and workers, protecting the environment, and
facilitating transparency and public participation in the
process. 71
Because nanotechnology raises significant oversight
challenges, it is important to consider now what kind of
oversight structures and processes would work well. This calls
for evaluating both emerging approaches to nanotechnology
oversight as well as oversight strategies used in the past for
closely related technologies. We can learn from case studies of
oversight for past technologies and products which approaches
have worked well and which have not. 72
There are some methods already in use for evaluating
oversight approaches, though they may require refinement.
These methods are grounded in different disciplines and
literatures, including public policy analysis, economic impact
assessment, and ethical evaluation. Whatever the disciplinary
origin, evaluation of oversight models to date has typically
used just a few criteria for analysis. For example, regulatory
impact assessment (RIA) by the U.S. federal government has
focused on the benefits and economic costs of proposed rules. 73
Executive Order 12,866 on Regulatory Planning and Review
suggests broader criteria, requiring for every new regulation
PERSP. 823, 835 (2005).
70. See ACCIÓN ECOLÓGICA ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF
NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND NANOMATERIALS 1 (2008), available at http://www.
icta.org/pubs/publications.cfm?page_id=15&section_title=Nanotechnology.
71. Id. at 2.
72. This is the focus of our current National Science Foundation grant,
SES-0608791 (Principal Investigator Susan M. Wolf; Co-Principal
Investigators Efrosini Kokkoli, Jennifer Kuzma, Jordan Paradise and
Gurumurthy Ramachandran). Co-author Ralph Hall serves as a Working
Group member on this project. An abstract is available at http://nsf.gov/
awardsearch/showAward.do?AwardNumber=0608791.
73. See U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS, at M2 (1983), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/
vwRepNumLookup/EE-0228A?OpenDocument.
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not only a cost-benefit test, but also evaluation of adverse
effects of regulations on health and the environment,
qualitative assessment of distributional impacts, and
assurances of transparency. 74
Some groups of scholars are making progress in
systematically integrating multiple criteria for analyzing
oversight frameworks. For example, one team designed the
Fast Environmental Regulatory Tool (FERET) as a
computerized template to “structure the basic integration of
impacts and valuation; provide a core survey of the literature;
incorporate uncertainty through simulation methods; and
deliver a bottom line benefit-cost analysis that reports
quantitative impacts, economics values, and qualitative
elements.” 75 A more qualitative oversight evaluation method
grounded in bioethics is reported in a 2004 article from the
Consortium to Examine Clinical Research Ethics. 76 This
diverse expert group designed fifteen oversight problems in
research involving human participants and evaluated whether
proposed reforms would address those challenges. 77
Oversight evaluation methods thus range from
quantitative models to qualitative expert group consensus
approaches. Whichever method we use to develop
nanotechnology oversight options, a preliminary inquiry
should focus on the goals oversight should serve. Likely goals
in developing oversight mechanisms for nanotechnology are
transparency in development, opportunities for public input,
accountability to diverse stakeholders, ability to safeguard
human and environmental health, and ability to foster
innovation. The mechanisms should also be able to cope with
novel materials that will undoubtedly be developed over time.
Debate over the need for and ultimate scope of
nanotechnology oversight is becoming increasingly urgent.
Development of sound oversight mechanisms responsive to
public concerns and values as well as nanoscience innovation
74. Wiener, supra note 67, at 493.
75. R. Scott Farrow et al., Facilitating Regulatory Design and
Stakeholder Participation: The FERET Template with an Application to the
Clean Air Act, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH
AND SAFETY 429, 430 (Paul Fischbeck & R. Scott Farrow eds., 2001).
76. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Oversight of Human Participants
Research: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals, 141 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 282, 282 (2004).
77. Id.
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will be critical to the evolution of this field. Creating oversight
systems can and should be deliberate, schooled by analyses of
different oversight regimes and historical consideration of
which oversight approaches have worked well for related
technologies in the past.

